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Abstract
We analyze the computational complexity of the problem of deciding
whether, for a given simple game, there exists the possibility of rearranging
the participants in a set of j given losing coalitions into a set of j winning
coalitions. We also look at the problem of turning winning coalitions into
losing coalitions. We analyze the problem when the simple game is rep-
resented by a list of wining, losing, minimal winning or maximal loosing
coalitions.
Keywords: Tradeness of Simple Games, Computational Complexity
1 Introduction
Simple games cover voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill
or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. In these systems, each voter
responds with a vote of yea and nay. Democratic societies and international
organizations use a wide variety of complex rules to reach decisions. Examples,
where it is not always easy to understand the consequences of the way vot-
ing is done, include the Electoral College to elect the President of the United
States, the United Nations Security Council, the governance structure of the
World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the European Union Council
of Ministers, the national governments of many countries, the councils in sev-
eral counties, and the system to elect the major in cities or villages of many
countries. Another source of examples comes from economic enterprises whose
owners are shareholders of the society and divide profits or losses proportionally
to the numbers of stocks they posses, but make decisions by voting according to
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a pre-defined rule (i.e., an absolute majority rule or a qualified majority rule).
See [11, 12] for a thorough presentation of theses and other examples. Such
systems have been analyzed as simple games.
Definition 1.1. A simple game Γ is a pair (N,W) in which N = {1, 2, . . . , n}
and W is a collection of subsets of N that satisfies: (1) N ∈ W, (2) ∅ /∈ W and
(3) the monotonicity property: S ∈ W and S ⊆ T ⊆ N implies T ∈ W.
The subsets of N are called coalitions, the coalitions inW are called winning
coalitions, and the coalitions that are not winning are called losing coalitions
(noted by L). Moreover, we say that a coalition is minimal winning (maximal
losing) if it is a winning (losing) coalition all of whose proper subsets (supersets)
are losing (winning). Because of monotonicity, any simple game is completely
determined by its set of minimal winning (maximal losing) coalitions denoted
by Wm (LM ). Note that a description of a simple game Γ can be given by
(N,X ), where X is W , L, Wm or LM , see [12]. We focus on the process of
exchanging or trading where a motivating example is the following:
Example 1.2. Consider two English football clubs that are in trouble and in
danger of leaving Premier League. Maybe the two clubs could trade with each
other and exchange players so they both could avoid relegation. We consider
the complexity of figuring out if such an exchange is possible for various ways
of knowing what it takes to form a strong team that is able to stay in Pre-
mier League. This can be viewed as a simple game where a winning coalition
corresponds to a strong team of players.
The considered property is the so called j-trade property for simple games.
Loosely speaking, a simple game is j-trade if it is possible to rearrange the
players in a set of j winning (losing) coalitions into a set of j losing (winning)
coalitions, in such a way that the total number of occurrences of each player is
the same in both sets. Thus, it is possible to go from one set to the other via
participant trades. This notion was introduced by Taylor and Zwicker [12] in
order to obtain a characterization of the weighted games, a subfamily of simple
games. Recall that any simple game can be expressed as the intersection of
weighted simple games. This leads to the definition of the dimension concept,
the minimum number of required weighted games whose intersection represents
the simple game [2, 6, 3]. Due to this fact, the problem of deciding whether a
simple game is weighted has been of interest in several contexts. With respect
to tradeness, it is known that a simple game is weighted if and only if it is not
j-trade for any non-negative integer j [12]. Freixas et al. [5] studied the compu-
tational complexity of deciding whether a simple game is weighted among other
decision problems for simple games. In particular, they showed that deciding
whether a simple game is weighted is polynomial time solvable when the game
is given by an explicit listing of one of the families W , L, Wm, LM . On the
other hand, the j-trade concept was also redefined as j-invariant-trade of simple
games [4] and extended as (j, k)-simple games [7].
Here we provide a definition of j-trade that uses a formalism that differ from
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the classic one for j-trade robustness applied to a simple game (see [1, 12, 4])
in order to ease the proofs of our new results.
Definition 1.3. Given a simple game Γ, a j-trade application is a set of 2j
coalitions (S1, . . . , S2j) such that ∃I ⊆ {1, . . . , 2j} that satisfies:
1. |I| = j
2. ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 2j}, Si ∈ W ⇐⇒ i ∈ I
3. ∀p ∈ N , |{i ∈ I : p ∈ Si}| = |{i ∈ {1, . . . , 2j} \ I : p ∈ Si}|
Definition 1.4. A simple game Γ is j-trade if it admits a j-trade application.
Example 1.5. The simple game defined by (N,Wm) = ({1, 2, 3, 4}, {{1, 3}, {2, 4}})
is 2-trade because it admits a 2-trade application. For instance, we can consider
the following set of coalitions ({1, 3}, {2, 4}, {1, 2}, {3, 4}) where {1, 3}, {2, 4} ∈
W, but {1, 2}, {3, 4} ∈ L.
Example 1.6. It is easy to generate a simple game that will be 2j-trade,
for an integer j. For instance, we can take the simple game (N,Wm) where
N = {1, . . . , 2j} and Wm = {{i, i + 1} | i ∈ 1, 3, 5, . . . , 2j − 1}. It is clear that
coalitions Li = {i, i + 1}, for all i ∈ {2, 4, 6, . . . , 2j − 2}, and L2j = {1, 2j}
are losing. Thus, the set of 2j coalitions Wm ∪
(
∪ji=1L2i
)
generates a j-trade
application.
Definition 1.7. A simple game Γ is j-trade robust if it is not j-trade.
Before formally defining the decision problems we focus on, we consider two
functions α and β associating games with various types of sets of coalitions. The
allowed types are the following α(Γ) ∈ {W ,L,Wm,LM} and β(Γ) ∈ {W ,L},
respectively. Moreover, given the β application we consider the function β that
provides the complementary type with respect to the function β.
β(Γ) =
{
W , if β(Γ) = L
L, if β(Γ) =W
Now we can state the definition of the considered computational problems,
observe that the value of α provides the type of coalitions used in the represen-
tation of the input game while the β function indicates the type of the coalitions
to be exchanged.
Definition 1.8. The (α, β, j)-trade problem, where j ∈ N, is
Input: A simple game Γ given by (N,α(Γ)) and j coalitions S1, . . . , Sj ∈ β(Γ).
Question: Do there exist Sj+1, . . . , S2j ∈ β(Γ) such that (S1, . . . , S2j) is a
j-trade application?
Definition 1.9. The (α, β)-Trade problem is the (α, β, 2)-trade problem.
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α(Γ) \ β(Γ) W
W polynomial
Wm NP-complete
L polynomial
LM polynomial
α(Γ) \ β(Γ) L
W polynomial
Wm polynomial
L polynomial
LM NP-complete
Table 1: Complexity for the (α, β)-Trade problem, where polynomial means
polynomially time solvable.
In the remaining part of the paper we analyze the computational complexity
of the above problems. Table 1 summarizes all results about the (α, β)-Trade
problem. We present first the results for the (α, β)-Trade problem and then
the results for the general case. We finalize with some conclusions and open
problems.
2 The computational complexity of trading two
given coalitions
We present first the types for which the (α, β)-Trade problems are polynomial
time solvable.
Proposition 2.1. The (α, β)-Trade problem is polynomially time solvable when
α(Γ) ∈ {W ,Wm,L} and β(Γ) = L.
Proof. We analyze each case separately. Let S1, S2 be two coalitions and assume
that both are of type β(Γ) = L.
• Case α(Γ) =W . Observe that we only need to check whether there are two
coalitions S3, S4 ∈ W such that (S1, S2, S3, S4) is a 2-trade application.
This property can be trivially checked in polynomial time by considering
all the pairs of coalitions inW . Therefore in polynomial time with respect
to the input size.
• Case α(Γ) = Wm. The algorithm is the following. First, we look for the
existence of two coalitions S3, S4 ∈ Wm such that, ∀p ∈ N , |{i ∈ {3, 4} :
p ∈ Si}| ≤ |{i ∈ {1, 2} : p ∈ Si}|. Observe that if such a pair of coalitions
exists we can add the missing players (if any) in such a way that, ∀p ∈ N ,
|{i ∈ {3, 4} : p ∈ Si}| = |{i ∈ {1, 2} : p ∈ Si}| and obtain a 2-trade
application.
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• Case α(Γ) = L. Now we compute Wm from L using the polynomial time
algorithm shown in [5] and reduce the problem to the previous case.
The same result can be proven when β(Γ) =W .
Proposition 2.2. The (α, β)-Trade problem is polynomially time solvable when
α(Γ) ∈ {L,LM ,W} and β(Γ) =W.
Proof. Arguments are symmetric to Proposition 2.1. Let S1, S2 be two coalitions
and assume that both are of type β(Γ) =W .
• Case α(Γ) = L. Here it is enough to check all pairs of losing coalitions.
The reasoning is symmetric to the first case of Proposition 2.1.
• Case α(Γ) = LM . The algorithm is symmetric to the second case of Propo-
sition 2.1. We check whether there are two maximal loosing coalitions S3
and S4 so that, ∀p ∈ N , |{i ∈ {3, 4} : p ∈ Si}| ≥ |{i ∈ {1, 2} : p ∈ Si}|.
If this is the case, by removing the additional players we get a 2-trade
application.
• If α(Γ) = W , we compute LM from W using the polynomial time algo-
rithm given in [5] and use the algorithm for the previous case.
In the following results we isolate the types giving rise to computationally
hard cases.
Proposition 2.3. The (α, β)-Trade problem is NP-complete when α(Γ) = LM
and β(Γ) = L.
Proof. The considered (α, β)-Trade problem is easily seen to be a member of
NP. We show that it is also NP-hard providing a reduction from the SAT problem.
Recall that the SAT asks whether a given boolean formula φ given in conjunctive
normal form is satisfiable or not. The SAT problem is a famous NP-complete
problem [8]. We let X = {x1,¬x1, x2,¬x2, . . . , xn,¬xn} be the literals of φ and
let Xi be the set of literals in the i’th clause of φ. Let m denote the number
of clauses of φ. Our reduction transforms φ into an equivalent instance of the
considered (α, β)-Trade problem in polynomial time.
The set of players of the associated game Γ = Γ(φ) contains the literals and
two extra players a and b: N = X ∪ {a, b}. A set of players Y can win if and
only if at least one of the following two conditions are met:
a ∈ Y ∧ ∀i = {1, 2, . . . ,m} : Y ∩Xi 6= ∅ (1)
b ∈ Y ∧ ∀j = {1, 2, . . . , n} : xj ∈ Y ∨ ¬xj ∈ Y (2)
It is not hard to see that this is indeed a simple game since any superset of a
winning set is also winning. We now have to show how to construct the set
5
of maximal loosing coalitions LM for this game in polynomial time. A set of
players S is loosing if and only if (1) and (2) are both violated. This happens if
and only if at least one of the following four conditions are met:
S ⊆ N \ {a, b} (3)
∃i : S ⊆ N \ (Xi ∪ {b}) (4)
∃j : S ⊆ N \ {a, xj ,¬xj} (5)
∃i, j : S ⊆ N \ (Xi ∪ {xj,¬xj}) (6)
If we consider all possible combinations of i and j then the sets on the right
hand side of these expressions form a set of loosing sets. Any loosing set is
contained in at least one of those sets. If we pick the maximal sets of this family
– which can be done in polynomial time – we get LM for the game Γ. The sets
S1 and S2 are constructed as follows: S1 = {a, b} and S2 = X .
Now assume that φ is a yes-instance to SAT. Let S3 be the set formed by
the player a and all literals corresponding to a truth-assignment satisfying φ
and let S4 be the set formed by the remaining literals and the player b. It is
easy to see that coalitions (S1, S2, S3, S4) are a 2-trade application of Γ, where
S1, S2 ∈ L and S3, S4 ∈ W .
On the other hand, note that such 2-trade application only exists if one
of the winning sets contain a and a set of literals defining a truth-assignment
satisfying φ. Thus, the instances to the SAT-problem and the considered (α, β)-
Trade problem are equivalent.
Using a symmetric construction to the previous one we have.
Proposition 2.4. The (α, β)-Trade problem is NP-complete when α(Γ) =Wm
and β(Γ) =W.
We conclude this section by isolating a parameter for which one of the hard
cases is fixed parameter tractable. We do so by providing a parameterized
reduction to the SetSplitting problem.
Proposition 2.5. The (α, β)-Trade problem, being α(Γ) = LM and β(Γ) = L,
is fixed parameter tractable when considering the parameter k = |LM |.
Proof. Recall that according to [8] the SetSplitting problem is the following
decision problem: Given a family F of subsets of a finite set U and an integer
k, decide whether there exists a partition of U into two subsets U1 and U2
such that at least k elements of F are split by this partition. Lokshtanov and
Saurabh [9] show that the SetSplitting problem is fixed parameter tractable
when the parameter is the integer k.
Now we provide a fixed parameter reduction from our case of the (α, β)-
Trade problem to the SetSplitting problem.
Given a simple game (N,LM ) and S1, S2 ∈ L. Let Zi = (S1 ∪ S2) \ Li for
Li ∈ LM such that S1 ∩ S2 ⊆ Li. Let F be the family of sets consisting of
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all the Zi’s. We construct the input to the SetSplitting problem given by
U = S1 ∪ S2, F and k = |F|.
Notice that there must be at least one member in F since S1 and S2 are
loosing coalitions. Moreover, the number of sets in F is always less than or
equal to |LM |.
Now we prove the following claim: Given a simple game (N,LM ) and
S1, S2 ∈ L, there exists S3, S4 ∈ W where (S1, S2, S3, S4) is a 2-trade appli-
cation if and only if F is a yes-instance to the SetSplitting problem.
If: Now assume that F is a yes-instance to the SetSplitting problem with
the sets U1 and U2 splitting the members of F . We will now prove that the
sets S3 = U1 ∪ (S1 ∩ S2) and S4 = U2 ∪ (S1 ∩ S2) are winning coalitions. Now
consider an arbitrary member Li ∈ LM . If S1 ∩ S2 ⊆ Li then U1 ∩ Zi 6= ∅
implying S3 6⊆ Li. If S1 ∩ S2 6⊆ Li then we also have S3 6⊆ Li. This holds for
any Li ∈ LM implying that S3 is winning. The same goes for S4. Note that
(U1, U2) is a partition of S1 ∪ S2, so every player appears the same number of
times in S3 and S4 as in S1 and S2.
Only if: Assume that we have a 2-trade application (S1, S2, S3, S4) where
S3, S4 ∈ W and S1, S2 ∈ L. Let R = {L ∈ LM : S1 ∩ S2 ⊆ L} and Ui =
Si \ (∩L∈RL) for i ∈ {3, 4}. It is not hard to see that U3 and U4 are disjoint.
What remains is to show that U3 and U4 split all the members of F .
Now consider an arbitrarily chosen set Zi. The coalition S3 is winning.
Therefore it contains at least one player that is not a member of Li ∈ LM . This
player is a member of U3 and it is also a member of Zi, so U3 ∩Zi 6= ∅. Finally,
the same argument can be used for U4.
Using the FPT Algorithm for the SetSplitting problem with complexity
f(k) + p(n), where k = |F| and n = |N |, for some function f and a polynomial
p, we get that the total complexity of the composed algorithm is f(|LM |) +
p(n)+O(n|LM |) as the time of computing the associated instance is O(n|LM |).
Thus, the claim follows.
3 The computational complexity of trading j
coalitions
Note that it is enough to check combinations of j-coalitions in LM or Wm to
seek for a j-trade application. This is so, because, if needed, we can remove
players from a maximal losing coalition or add players to a minimal wining
coalition getting loosing or winning coalitions that matches the requirements
for the j-trade application.
Theorem 3.1. For a fixed j, given a simple game Γ = (N,W), we can decide
whether such a simple game is j-trade in polynomial time. Furthermore, if the
game is j-trade, a j-trade application can be efficiently computed.
Proof. We start by computing LM fromW using the polynomial time algorithm
given in [5]. Then, we try all the possible combinations of j members of W and
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j members of LM (repetitions are allowed) to find a j-trade application. This
requires
(
|W|
j
)
combinations.
The algorithm works because there is such j-trade application if and only
if there is a j-trade application where all losing coalitions are maximal losing
coalitions.
Next we present a similar result but for the case in which the game is given
by Γ = (N,L).
Theorem 3.2. For a fixed j, given a simple game Γ = (N,L), we can decide
whether such a simple game is j-trade in polynomial time. Furthermore, if the
game is j-trade, a j-trade application can be efficiently computed.
Proof. We start by computing Wm from L in polynomial time [5] and proceed
as Theorem 3.1.
Now we adapt the result of Proposition 2.3 for the (α, β)-Trade problem to
the (α, β, j)-trade problem
Proposition 3.3. The (α, β, j)-trade problem is NP-complete when α(Γ) = LM
and β(Γ) = L.
Proof. The argument is quite similar to the one used in the proof of Propo-
sition 2.3, but considering that the set of players of the game Γ contains the
literals and 2+2 ·(j−2) extra players, i.e., a, b, and c1i and c2i for i ∈ {3, . . . , j}.
Thus, we have that N = X ∪ {a, b} ∪ji=3 {c1i, c2i}. A set of players Y can win
if and only if at least one of the following conditions are met:
a ∈ Y ∧ ∀i = {1, 2, . . . ,m} : Y ∩Xi 6= ∅ (7)
b ∈ Y ∧ ∀j = {1, 2, . . . , n} : xj ∈ Y ∨ ¬xj ∈ Y (8)
{c1i, c2i} ⊆ Y, ∀i ∈ {3, 4, . . . , j} . (9)
As winning coalitions we have
Sj+1 = {a, all true literals corresponding to
a truth-assignment satisfying φ},
Sj+2 = {b, the remaining literals that are
not in S1},
Sj+i = {c1i, c2i} , ∀i ∈ {3, 4, . . . , j}.
Finally, as losing coalitions we distinguish two cases:
• If j is even,
S1 = X,
S2 = {a, b},
Si = {c1i, c1,i+1} , ∀i ∈ {3, 5, 7, . . . , j − 1}
Si = {c2,i−1, c2i} , ∀i ∈ {4, 6, 8, . . . , j} .
8
• If j is odd
S1 = X,
S2 = {a, c1j},
Si = {c1i, c1,i+1} , ∀i ∈ {3, 5, 7, . . . , j − 1}
Si = {c2,i−1, c2i} , ∀i ∈ {4, 6, 8, . . . , j − 2}
S2j = {b, c2j} .
4 Related Remaining Problems
In this paper we have focused on the computational complexity of trade ro-
bustness problems for simple games. Our results are summarized in Table 1.
Nevertheless, there remain many related open questions. Let us highlight some
of them.
Because constructing W or L from Wm or LM , respectively, is not polyno-
mially solvable, we post the following conjecture.
Conjecture 4.1. For a fixed j, to decide whether a game given by either
(N,Wm) or (N,LM ) is j-trade is coNP-complete.
We recall that a simple game is weighted if and only if it is j-trade robust
for any non-negative integer j, see the characterization given by Taylor and
Zwicker [12]. This leads us to the following problem
Trade robustness problem.
Input: A simple game Γ and a non-negative integer j.
Question: Is Γ a j-trade robust game?
Whose computational complexity remains open for the different forms of repre-
sentations of simple games considered in this paper.
In a recent paper Molinero et al. [10] introduced influence games. Influence
games provide a succinct form of representation for simple games based on
graphs. It would be of interest to analyze the complexity of the (α, β, j)-trade
and the trade robustness problems when the simple game is given as an influence
game.
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